Bioethics Forum Essay
What The Lord of the Rings can Teach Us About MAID
As a nurse whose career included working in home care and covering hospice patients, I cared for people whose suffering demanded generous use of pain medication, whose comfort required constant attention and whose approaching deaths could not be prevented. I never understood my responsibility as simply to prolong life. It’s to relieve suffering and help patients die as comfortably and peacefully as possible.
Medical aid in dying was not a legal option during those years. Now, as it becomes part of clinical practice in the state where I work, I find myself contemplating how I might respond if a dying patient asked me to help bring about their death.
I imagine I would feel profound sadness, not because I failed to understand suffering, but because I understood it and could not offer what was being asked of me. I might begin by asking the patient what had made death seem preferable to continued life. And if the patient persisted, I might find myself gently saying, “I can’t help you with that.”
My refusal would not be without emotional cost to me. That refusal would arise not from indifference to suffering but from a conviction about the moral limits of what I could do to relieve it, even as I recognized the disappointment my refusal might cause the patient.
In my work as a clinical ethicist, I have come to appreciate that people can be equally committed to relieving suffering and yet profoundly disagree about what compassion requires of them.
And this is where I have learned some lessons from J.R.R. Tolkien. Tolkien knew that moral life was more complicated than a contest between good people and bad people.
In The Lord of the Rings, Frodo must destroy the Ring because its power to dominate others corrupts anyone who attempts to wield it. Gandalf, the wise wizard who guides Frodo and his companions on their journey to destroy the Ring, refuses the Ring because he understands that even his desire to do good could become the instrument of his corruption. The Ring thus illustrates a moral danger: Evil cannot always be defeated by appropriating its power, because the attempt to use evil for a righteous purpose may transform the user into what he opposes. Moral action depends not only on the end pursued but also on the means chosen to pursue it.
In a BBC interview, Tolkien was asked about the morality of The Lord of the Rings. The broad lines between good and evil might seem straightforward, Tolkien acknowledged, but the reality was not. Evil could appear “on the good side.” His stories repeatedly return to a related problem: People can act from motives they believe are good and still do something morally wrong.
That insight has something to say about one of the most difficult questions now confronting medicine.
MAID is usually defended in the language of compassion. A patient is suffering. Death is approaching. The patient has decision-making capacity and persistently asks for control over the circumstances of death. A physician or nurse who supports that choice may be motivated by genuine concern for the patient and a sincere desire to relieve suffering. But good motives do not settle the moral question.
For clinicians who conscientiously object to MAID, that distinction matters. Their objection is sometimes treated as an obstacle that must be managed so that the patient can receive a legally available medical service. That approach may be administratively understandable. It is morally incomplete. The clinician is also a moral agent.
That does not mean a physician or nurse should be permitted to prevent a competent patient from pursuing a legally available option. Nor does it mean that every claim of conscience deserves accommodation. Medicine could not function if every professional obligation could be set aside merely by invoking personal belief.
Conscience also has limits, and exercising it can have professional consequences. A clinician who cannot perform duties that are central to a chosen role may have to reconsider whether they can fulfill that role. But that is different from assuming that every legally permitted practice automatically becomes an obligation for every clinician. Healthcare institutions have policies that account for a clinician’s conscientious objection to taking part in a practice.
A practice can be legal, professionally regulated, and supported by compassionate motives while remaining, for some clinicians, something in which they believe they cannot morally participate. The relevant question goes beyond whether MAID is permitted. It is what participation requires of someone who believes the act itself is wrong. That distinction can disappear when conscientious objection is reduced to a refusal to write a prescription.
Participation has boundaries, and those boundaries are not always obvious. A physician may be unwilling to prescribe lethal medication to a patient who has requested it but be willing to continue treating the patient in other ways. A nurse may provide symptom management and emotional support while declining involvement in the aid-in-dying process itself. Another clinician may believe that making a referral to a doctor who participates in MAID makes her sufficiently responsible for the eventual act that she cannot do so in good conscience.
These distinctions matter because they help define what medicine can reasonably require of a clinician with a conscientious objection. .
This is where Tolkien’s writing can be instructive to clinicians as a way of seeing the moral problem posed by MAID more clearly. One can be compassionate, act out of loyalty, and have good intentions, but these qualities do not negate a potential evil. For those who believe MAID is morally wrong, good intentions are not enough. For opponents of MAID, assisting another person to end his or her life does not become morally right because the circumstances are tragic or the motivation noble and compassionate.
That distinction is central to conscientious objection. If good intentions do not determine the moral character of an act, then compassion by itself cannot answer the objection of the clinician who believes participation in MAID would be wrong. One’s objection need neither reflect indifference to suffering nor disregard of the patient. Rather, it may reflect a different judgment about what compassion allows one to do, versus what it calls one to do.
The patient’s moral agency matters. But, so does the clinician’s. A physician is not merely the means through which a patient’s autonomous choice is carried out. She remains morally responsible for her own participation. A patient seeking medical aid in dying should not lose the ability to pursue a lawful decision because her clinician objects. But neither should the clinician’s moral agency disappear because the law permits what the patient seeks.
American law has long recognized that legally permitted medical practices may nevertheless be subject to protections for conscientious refusal. Medicine also has practical mechanisms for handling these conflicts: disclosure, transfer of care, referral pathways and limits on what objecting clinicians may refuse to do. Healthcare institutions, too, have a responsibility to consider the moral questions raised by conscientious objection as they implement these practices. These mechanisms do not settle the underlying moral disagreement. They make room for it.
Tolkien understood that good intentions can coexist with grave harm. As medical aid in dying increasingly becomes part of medical practice, Tolkien’s warning reminds us that the recognition of conscience in law and policy does not eliminate the moral responsibility of the individual clinician.
I thank Dr. Joseph J. Fins for his helpful editorial comments.
Joan M. Tennyson, MS, BSN, RN, HEC-C, is a senior clinical ethicist and Division Administrator in the Division of Medical Ethics at Weill Cornell Medicine. LinkedIn joan-tennyson-ms-bsn-hec













