Bioethics Forum Essay
Resisting Public Health Measures, Then and Now
We owe the “rounders” an apology. Rounders were tuberculosis patients in the early 20th century who left hospitals against medical advice when they felt better and later wound up at another hospital. While “making the rounds,” they potentially infected others with their disease. Health officials routinely criticized these individuals for endangering the public.
One of the most surprising aspects of the Covid-19 pandemic for those of us who teach the history of public health is how unwilling many Americans have been to adopt health measures to protect others. Over the Thanksgiving holiday, tens of millions of Americans traveled, despite the fact that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention urged them to stay home and the overall death rate from the coronavirus is approaching 300,000. Should recent events make us revisit aspects of the history of public health? And how can these stories inform future public health efforts during pandemics?
Tuberculosis was the disease that most forcefully established the right of public health officials to control the behaviors of infectious patients. Building on the recent discovery by German scientist Robert Koch that tuberculosis was a communicable disease, Hermann Biggs of the New York City Department of Health established a groundbreaking program in the 1890s to fight the spread of the disease—opening public health laboratories, tracing contacts of patients and quarantining the actively ill.
There was substantial early pushback in New York and elsewhere, but ultimately public health science won the day. The right to mandate specific behaviors became legally codified in 1905, when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Jacobson v. Massachusetts that officials could require the payment of a fine to the health department from citizens who refused to be vaccinated for smallpox. “There are manifold restraints,” the court wrote, “to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good.” Two years earlier, New York City had opened Riverside Sanatorium to forcibly detain tuberculosis patients on an island in the East River.
Early health officials had nothing but contempt for rounders. Referring to an earlier term for tuberculosis, “consumption,” Biggs wrote that “homeless, friendless, dependent, dissipated and vicious consumptives are those which are likely to be most dangerous to the community.” The disdain for rounders occurred not only because of their behavior, but also because they were often poor, unemployed and immigrants.
Keeping infectious tuberculosis patients hospitalized for long periods was made especially difficult because no effective treatments for tuberculosis existed at this time. As the disease could last for years, it was hard to justify—and pay for—essentially permanent hospitalization.
But by the 1950s, effective antimicrobials existed that could treat the disease if taken regularly for 12 or more months. Once again, however, patients who felt better insisted on leaving their sanatoriums and became noncompliant with medications. Erratic medication use bred drug-resistant, potentially untreatable strains of the disease.
This lost opportunity to cure tuberculosis patients led to a rejuvenation of aggressive public health measures. Seattle, for example, wound up detaining thousands of individuals against their will up until 1973. Health officials there no longer used Biggs’ overtly pejorative language, but routinely termed their “recalcitrant” patients to be “menaces to the public’s health.”
Once again, those detained at Seattle’s Firland Sanatorium came from the poorest populations in the city—mostly itinerant, alcoholic white men who lived in flophouses along the city’s Skid Road. At times, officials also detained Native Americans and women. A Firland chart referred to one patient as “this wild young Indian girl.”
One might argue that tuberculosis and the coronavirus are apples and oranges. After all, people with tuberculosis had an actual disease while those recently traveling probably believed themselves to be healthy. But, in fact, a major reason that some tuberculosis patients demanded their liberty was that they felt fine and, indeed, were no longer actively infectious. The doctors had merely decided that unreliable Skid Road patients needed to stay hospitalized and take their pills until they were permanently cured—which often took months after they were no longer infectious. “We want to know by what right, and on what authority, this is being done,” complained one patient.
Historians writing about the detention of patients with tuberculosis and other infectious diseases, such as typhoid fever patient Mary Mallon (“Typhoid Mary”), have been highly critical of these episodes, viewing health officials as overly aggressive—as well as racist and classist. Patients, according to this paradigm, justifiably rebelled because they were being singled out unfairly.
But what if the explanation is simpler: despite the dangers presented by serious infectious diseases, many people—regardless of their social class—don’t like restrictions, whether for their own good or the good of others. Two other facts support this conclusion. First, the U.S. has always had a strong tradition of individualism and libertarianism. And second, nonadherence to medical recommendations is extremely common, regardless of patients’ health insurance or medical literacy.
If true, perhaps we need to revisit how we have understood the history of restrictive public health measures. Maybe it is not merely a story of disadvantaged populations rejecting well-meaning but insensitive interventions imposed by the state, but rather a more universal rejection of being told what to do. Perhaps widespread repudiation of public health authority has been going on all along—but historians (aside from those writing about vaccination) have largely told the stories of those whose forcible confinement engendered controversy.
What might this conclusion mean for future public health measures? Even though Jacobson v. Massachusetts theoretically provides the legal framework for restrictive measures during a pandemic, it does not ensure that citizens will comply. And it is hard to imagine health departments having the resources or political will to forcibly change people’s behaviors.
We must double down on our efforts to engender a communitarian mindset, even in a country that cherishes its individual liberties. One way to do so is to depoliticize public health, emphasizing what the science does and does not show. In addition, let’s focus less on whether people are breaking the rules and more on mitigating bad outcomes when they do so. For example, those who travel can be encouraged to reduce contacts and adopt other safety measures.
It is tempting to tell the history of public health as a story of right versus wrong. And egregious violations of public health need to be condemned. But it makes sense to acknowledge our longstanding, complicated responses to epidemic diseases.
Barron H. Lerner, professor in the Division of Medical Ethics at New York University Langone Health, is the author of The Good Doctor: A Father, a Son and the Evolution of Medical Ethics and Contagion and Confinement: Controlling Tuberculosis Along the Skid Road. He is a Hastings Center fellow. @barronlerner
It is worth revisiting these questions about state authority and public health compliance now that we have a little distance from the COVID-19 pandemic. Even in 2024, we are still searching for answers: Where did our response fail? Why did it fail? How do we plan for the future amidst so much fervent division?
Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905) provides the legal basis for state vaccination mandates (“It is within the police power of a State to enact a compulsory vaccination law…”) and detainment upon refusal (“The liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States does not import an absolute right in each person to be at all times, and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint…”). In truth, it is hard to imagine the Jacobson decision being rendered today without causing considerable outrage. It certainly runs against the opinion famously written by Cardozo in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital (1914): “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.” This is arguably more of a moral assertion than a legal principle; there are a number of exceptions to individual bodily autonomy, mandatory vaccination being but one. The holding of Jacobson v. Massachusetts grates against this American belief in individualism and self-determination because of its positivist bent. It emphasized social fact – on the same population-level plane as public health – and left no room for moral views like the value of individual liberty (the decision also held that the Constitution’s preamble, though morally rich, holds no legal authority). This is fitting, in a way, considering some view public health as a positivist field.
It seems that insubordinate opinion views the refusal to comply with public health directives as falling along the same lines as the individual’s right to refuse treatment in the medical environment. Key cases like Cruzan v. Director, MI Dept. of Health (1990) and, as mentioned, Schloendorff have upheld this right for patients. However, I feel it is fair to argue that this right does not extend to public health in the same way. When risk extends beyond the individual and outside of the medical context, we must reassess. This shares some similarities with the reasoning behind the California Supreme Court’s holding in Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California (1976).
When we consider the failures of COVID-19, Jacobson v. Massachusetts is also relevant to one of the factors that I believe doomed the United States’ response to the pandemic. The case involved a man who resisted compliance with a local health department’s smallpox vaccinate mandate. (It is worth noting briefly that the court’s decision allowed for exceptions to mandates, but they found that Jacobson did not offer proof that he might qualify). Massachusetts law asserted the following, which justified the policy:
“the board of health of a city or town if, in its opinion, it is necessary for the public health or safety shall require and enforce the vaccination and revaccination of all the inhabitants thereof and shall provide them with the means of free vaccination. Whoever, being over twenty-one years of age and not under guardianship, refuses or neglects to comply with such requirement shall forfeit five dollars.”
This trickle-down effect of responsibility (federal inaction endorsing state power, which authorizes local policy) creates a porous and ineffective response to disease outbreaks, particularly when a swift response is needed. Realistically, any federal action to require vaccines would probably be deeply unpopular and face significant pushback from state governments and the courts, even though there are mechanisms through which these mandates could theoretically be justified. In 2021, Biden attempted to push large business to establish policies requiring vaccinations or weekly COVID testing using an OSHA emergency rule, but the Supreme Court blocked it; it was deemed an over-reach of OSHA’s authority. , Texas Senator Ted Cruz introduced a bill in the 118th Congress to prohibit mandates for emergency use authorization vaccines for COVID-19 (it was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee and has gone no further). Americans are simply too distrustful of the government for an expansive vaccine policy to succeed, and even localized attempts are unpopular. Ultimately, lack of a comprehensive national or even state-wide approach allows for self-determination to take precedence over public interest. As Fuller states in his work on the morality of law, consistency is crucial: rules must not be changed so frequently so as to be unreliable, and they must not contradict each other. The layers of incomplete decision-making permit individuals to see a range of possible actions when guidance should be directing them to a more distinct goal.
A crucial element of the Jacobson holding was the state’s power to police people to fulfill its duty to ensure public health and safety. This produces an interesting friction: research suggests that aggressive policing is associated with poorer public health outcomes, particularly among racial minorities. Perhaps there is merit not just in depoliticizing public health, as argued above, but depolicing it, too. The history of public health has often been one of enforcement – the Public Health Service is a uniformed corps, for instance. A communitarian perspective, as the essay notes, is more ideal. Policing threats as the primary deterrents of non-compliance do little to engender more trust in the government. (Supporters of non-governmental vaccine regulations such as employer mandates might argue that employment termination is a better incentive for compliance, but concerns about policy inconsistency apply here, too.) A community-driven approach to public health opens the door for restructuring society’s moral frameworks. If, as mentioned above, public health is also viewed to be a positivist field, then I believe that there is a need to introduce a more coherent moral ideology to public health. Empiricism can alienate people based on education level, but under a more defined, collective code of ethics, there can be a more universal commitment to and understanding of compliance.
The lessons of Jacobson v. Massachusetts in the context of COVID-19 emphasize the fundamental tensions at the heart of American identity: the liberty we cherish is not absolute, and the law is an imperfect vehicle of moral adjudication. Now, whether societal ethical reform and consensus is attainable is a harder question that is beyond consideration here. An aspirational approach to public health compliance will at least challenge us to consider bolder, more consequential strategies that might help to break the pattern of insufficient disease response.
1. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/197/11/#tab-opinion-1921098
2. https://casetext.com/case/schloendorff-v-new-york-hospital
3. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/#DeveInfl
4. https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=ois_papers
5. https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/17/425.html
6. Supra note 1
7. https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/current-constitutional-issues-related-to-vaccine-mandates
8. https://law.stanford.edu/2022/01/20/a-look-at-the-supreme-court-ruling-on-vaccination-mandates/
9. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/21a244_hgci.pdf
10. https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-bill/167/text
11. https://iep.utm.edu/legalpos/#SH4a
12. https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20210412.997570/