Neuroscience and Society is a three-year series of articles and essays on the ethical, legal, and social issues presented by emerging neuroscience. It is published open access in the Hastings Center Report with funding from the Dana Foundation. The series fosters dynamic, sustained conversation among neuroscience researchers and legal and ethics scholars with one another, policymakers, and wider publics.

Development of the series is led by Gregory E. Kaebnick with support from Erik Parens and the guidance of a steering committee of six scholars:
Jennifer Chandler, University of Ottawa
Winston Chiong, University of California San Francisco
Joseph J. Fins, Weill Cornell Medical School
Sara Goering, University of Washington
Jonathan D. Moreno, University of Pennsylvania
Oliver Rollins, University of Washington

Contributing to the Series
New submissions to the series are welcome. Contact Gregory E. Kaebnick at kaebnickg@thehastingscenter.org.

Table of Contents

• Neuroscience and Society: Supporting and Unsettling Public Engagement, Gregory E. Kaebnick
• Brain Pioneers and Moral Entanglement: An Argument for Post-trial Responsibilities in Neural-Device Trials, Sara Goering, Andrew I. Brown, and Eran Klein
• Identity Theft, Deep Brain Stimulation, and the Primacy of Post-trial Obligations, Joseph J. Fins, Amanda R. Merner, Megan S. Wright, and Gabriel Lázaro- Muñoz
• Experiential Training in Psychedelic-Assisted Therapy: A Risk-Benefit Analysis, Daniel Rosenbaum, Crystal Hare, Emma Hapke, Yarissa Herman, Susan E. Abbey, Dominic Sisti, and Daniel Z. Buchman
• Inferring Mental States from Brain Data: Ethico-legal Questions about Social Uses of Brain Data, Jennifer A. Chandler
• Knowing the Mind from Brain Data: The Challenge of Prediction and the Fairness of Relying on Objective Data about the Mind, Jennifer A. Chandler
• Participant Engagement, Epistemic Injustice, and Early-Phase Implanted Neural Device Research, Lilyana Levy,  Ashley Feinsinger
• Speech Restoration & Mental Surveillance as Conflicting Ethical Concerns in Neural Speech-Decoding Research, Narayan Sankaran, Winston Chiong
• Two Kinds of Mental Privacy: What Speech Decoding Does and Does Not Threaten, Marcello Ienca
• Promises but Also Perils: Why We Should Not Dismiss Mental Surveillance Risks in Neurotechnology Research, Andrea Lavazza
• Recognizing Brain Pioneering as Hard Work: Strategies for Making Research Participation More Meaningful, Erika Versalovic,  Beatriz Mamede,  Sara Goering,  Eran Klein

Gregory E. Kaebnick, “Neuroscience and Society: Supporting and Unsettling Public Engagement,” Hastings Center Report 54, no. 1 (2024): 20-23. DOI: 10.1002/hast.1565
Abstract: Advancing neuroscience is one of many topics that pose a challenge often called “the alignment problem”—the challenge, that is, of assuring that science policy is responsive to and in some sense squares with the public’s values. This issue of the Hastings Center Report launches a series of scholarly essays and articles on the ethical and social issues raised by this vast body of medical research and bench science. The series, which will run under the banner “Neuroscience and Society,” is supported by the Dana Foundation and seeks to promote deliberative public engagement, broadly understood, about neuroscience. As a social goal, deliberative public engagement is both ubiquitous and elusive—called for everywhere yet difficult to undertake at a national level on a complex scientific topic. To be meaningful, deliberative public engagement must occur in many locations in a society and be carried forward by many actors. Scholarly writing might contribute in several ways.

Sara Goering, Andrew I. Brown, and Eran Klein, “Brain Pioneers and Moral Entanglement: An Argument for Post-trial Responsibilities in Neural-Device Trials,” Hastings Center Report 54, no. 1 (2024): 24- 33. DOI: 10.1002/hast.1566
Abstract: We argue that in implanted neurotechnology research, participants and researchers experience what Henry Richardson has called “moral entanglement.” Participants partially entrust researchers with access to their brains and thus to information that would otherwise be private, leading to created intimacies and special obligations of beneficence for researchers and research funding agencies. One of these obligations, we argue, is about continued access to beneficial technology once a trial ends. We make the case for moral entanglement in this context through exploration of participants’ vulnerability, uncompensated risks and burdens, depth of relationship with the research team, and dependence on researchers in implanted neurotechnology trials.

Joseph J. Fins, Amanda R. Merner, Megan S. Wright, and Gabriel Lázaro- Muñoz, “Identity Theft, Deep Brain Stimulation, and the Primacy of Post-trial Obligations,” Hastings Center Report 54, no. 1 (2024): 34-41. DOI: 10.1002/hast.1567
Abstract: Patient narratives from two investigational deep brain stimulation trials for traumatic brain injury and obsessive-compulsive disorder reveal that injury and illness rob individuals of personal identity and that neuromodulation can restore it. The early success of these interventions makes a compelling case for continued post-trial access to these technologies. Given the centrality of personal identity to respect for persons, a failure to provide continued access can be understood to represent a metaphorical identity theft. Such a loss recapitulates the pain of an individual’s initial injury or illness and becomes especially tragic because it could be prevented by robust policy. A failure to fulfill this normative obligation constitutes a breach of disability law, which would view post-trial access as a means to achieve social reintegration through this neurotechnological accommodation.

Daniel Rosenbaum, Crystal Hare, Emma Hapke, Yarissa Herman, Susan E. Abbey, Dominic Sisti, and Daniel Z. Buchman, Experiential Training in Psychedelic-Assisted Therapy: A Risk-Benefit Analysis, Hastings Center Report 54, no. 4 (2024): 32-46. DOI: 10.1002/hast.1602

Abstract: Well-trained, competent therapists are crucial for safe and effective psychedelic-assisted therapy (PAT). The question whether PAT training programs should require aspiring therapists to undergo their own PAT—commonly referred to as “experiential training”—has received much attention within the field. In this article, we analyze the potential benefits of experiential training in PAT by applying the framework developed by Rolf Sandell et al. concerning the functions of any training therapy (the therapeutic, modeling, empathic, persuasive, and theoretical functions). We then explore six key domains in which risks could arise through mandatory experiential training: physical and psychological risks; negative impact on therapeutic skill; justice, equity, diversity, and inclusion; dual relationships; privacy and confidentiality; and undue pressure. Ultimately, we argue that experiential training in PAT should not be mandatory. Because many PAT training programs already incorporate experiential training methods, our exploration of potential harms and benefits may be used to generate comprehensive risk-mitigation strategies.

Jennifer A. Chandler, Inferring Mental States from Brain Data: Ethico-legal Questions about Social Uses of Brain Data, Hastings Center Report 55, no. 1 (2024): 22-32. DOI: 10.1002/hast.4958

Abstract: Neurotechnologies that collect and interpret data about brain activity are already in use for medical and nonmedical applications. Refinements of existing noninvasive techniques and the discovery of new ones will likely encourage broader uptake. The increased collection and use of brain data and, in particular, their use to infer the existence of mental states have led to questions about whether mental privacy may be threatened. It may be threatened if the brain data actually support inferences about the mind or if decisions are made about a person in the belief that the inferences are justified. This article considers the chain of inferences lying between data about neural activity and a particular mental state as well as the ethico-legal issues raised by making these inferences, focusing here on what the threshold of reliability should be for using brain data to infer mental states.

Jennifer A. Chandler, Knowing the Mind from Brain Data: The Challenge of Prediction and the Fairness of Relying on Objective Data about the Mind, Hastings Center Report 55, no. 4 (2025): 15-23. DOI: 10.1002/hast.70000

Abstract: This article is the second in a series examining the ethical and social implications of inferring mental states from brain data. It considers two main topics. First, it discusses the challenges of extending inferences from present brain activity to mental states and from there to future mental states or behaviors. There is a risk of compounded errors when multiple inferential models are applied sequentially; harmful outcomes for minority groups underrepresented in statistical models could result. In addition, predictions based on brain data may create self-fulfilling prophecies, reinforcing neuroessentialist beliefs that undermine personal agency. Second, the paper discusses how concerns related to epistemic injustice might arise when mental states are inferred from brain data. In particular, it asks if it is just to privilege “objective” brain-based conclusions over individuals’ subjective self-reports. While brain-based evidence could empower some people to prove their claims, it may also exacerbate credibility gaps and social biases. The article concludes that careful, context-specific assessments are essential before brain-based inferences are adopted in socially significant decisions.

Lilyana Levy,  Ashley Feinsinger, Participant Engagement, Epistemic Injustice, and Early-Phase Implanted Neural Device Research, Hastings Center Report 55, no. 5 (2025): 18-28. DOI: 10.1002/hast.70022

Abstract: In recent years, participant engagement initiatives in research on implanted neural devices have significantly increased. However, there remains little consensus on the motivations, goals, and best practices for engagement efforts. Drawing on the concept of participatory epistemic injustice, we argue that one core ethical motivation for engagement is epistemic in nature. Based on their subject positions, participants should be key knowledge contributors to implanted neurotech research. Therefore, we argue, participants experience participatory epistemic injustice when their insights do not result in changes to or otherwise influence research protocols, device development, and task design. We contend that engagement can resist this type of injustice only if it establishes robust methods not only to gather but also to actively incorporate participant knowledge into the research and development process.

Narayan Sankaran and Winston Chiong, Speech Restoration and Mental Surveillance as Conflicting Ethical Concerns in Neural Speech-Decoding Research, Hastings Center Report 56, no. 5 (2026). DOI: 10.1002/hast.70090

Abstract: The research program of speech decoding—“reading” words directly from brain activity—elicits an unusually wide range of public responses, reflecting a tension between the ethical goal of restoring speech for people with serious communication disabilities and the ethical goal of protecting mental privacy from neurotechnological surveillance. These competing moral perspectives are informed by intrinsic features of the research but also by the broader sociocultural context in which neuroscience is conducted and is communicated to an increasingly interested public. Whereas prior neuroethical literature has looked “downstream” from this research in proposing governance frameworks, in this paper we turn “upstream” to the neuroscience of language to consider how ethical tensions may be informed by the specific neural circuits from which speech is inferred. Our analysis identifies the communicative intent of neural signals as a key feature of some but not all speech-decoding strategies, and we argue that whether a speech BCI decodes linguistic information with or without communicative intent should inform assessments of the ethical implications of the research. At the level of public discourse, we show how such distinctions can inform responsible science communication about future advances in this fast-moving field.

Marcello Ienca, Two Kinds of Mental Privacy: What Speech Decoding Does and Does Not Threaten, Hastings Center Report 56, no. 5 (2026). DOI: 10.1002/hast.70116

Abstract: In the article “Speech Restoration and Mental Surveillance as Conflicting Ethical Concerns in Neural Speech-Decoding Research,” Narayan Sankaran and Winston Chiong distinguish speech-decoding strategies by whether they read brain signals tied to communicative intent, softening the common equation of neural decoding with mind reading. This commentary situates their distinction within a broader conceptual map of mental privacy, borrowing Noam Chomsky’s distinction between the narrow and broad senses of the language faculty. Mental privacy in the narrow sense concerns the decoding of occurrent mental states—thoughts, feelings, intentions—the domain Sankaran and Chiong address. Mental privacy in the broad sense concerns statistical inferences about traits, risks, and dispositions from brain data, which can wrong a person without there being any decoding of their mental state at all. The two senses implicate different harms, different relations to cognitive liberty, and different regulatory logics: intent-based authorization for narrow-sense decoding, purpose limitation and proportionality review for broad-sense inference. Distinguishing them clarifies what current speech-decoding research does, and does not, threaten.

Andrea Lavazza, Promises but Also Perils: Why We Should Not Dismiss Mental Surveillance Risks in Neurotechnology Research, Hastings Center Report 56, no. 5 (2026). DOI: 10.1002/hast.70119

Abstract: Speech brain-computer interfaces may restore communication to people who have lost the ability to speak. In the article “Speech Restoration and Mental Surveillance as Conflicting Ethical Concerns in Neural Speech-Decoding Research,” Narayan Sankaran and Winston Chiong distinguish systems that decode intended speech from those that might reveal thoughts a person does not wish to communicate. This commentary argues that the surveillance question also extends beyond the device being tested. Research for clinical purposes produces methods, expertise, and infrastructure that could later be adapted for other uses, although present speech interfaces cannot simply be turned into surveillance tools. Mental privacy matters because it protects the space in which people reflect, revise their judgments, and decide what to share. Patients may reasonably accept some privacy risks to communicate, but their choices cannot authorize future uses that affect others. Researchers, funders, and regulators should therefore consider misuse early, involve prospective users in design decisions, and develop safeguards, including international coordination, that preserve access to speech restoration while limiting unwanted neural monitoring.

Erika Versalovic, Beatriz Mamede, Sara Goering, and Eran Klein, Recognizing Brain Pioneering as Hard Work: Strategies for Making Research Participation More Meaningful, Hastings Center Report 56, no. 5 (2026). DOI: 10.1002/hast.70047

Abstract: Brain-computer interface (BCI) research offers novel opportunities for new tools for mobility and communication for those limited by injury or illness. Despite this promise, current BCI research remains largely early stage and without direct therapeutic benefits for the trial participants with motor disabilities who invest extensive time and energy in research trials. In interviews our neuroethics research group conducted, participants in nontherapeutic BCI trials invoked job-like or work-like comparisons as they recounted the demandingness (long commutes, tedious tasks, and tiring hours) and rewards (skill building, satisfaction, and coworker-like social relationships) of the trials. These comparisons, paired with the lack of therapeutic benefit, prompted our reflection on how participation in these long-term, active-engagement studies fits the conceptual framework of meaningful work. Examining trial participants’ testimonies through meaningful work’s dimensions of excellence, social contribution, community, recognition, and agency reveals useful strategies for ensuring that the extensive time and effort trial participants invest in these trials is recognized, respected, and made meaningful.